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CLO RISK RETENTION: A CASE STUDY IN 
REGULATORY INDISCRETION 
ELLIOT GANZ & PHILLIP BLACK* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the financial crisis, the originate-to-distribute (“OTD”) 
model arose as a common form of securitization, especially in the 
residential-mortgage markets.1  The OTD model contained all the 
elements of traditional securitizations: it called for pooling loans that 
would serve as the basis for the issuing of securities whose 
creditworthiness would vary depending on the priority of claim to the 
cash flows from the underlying loans.  But rather than pooling loans that 
had been originated partly, if not totally, for the investment purposes of 
the originating lender, OTD called for pooling loans that were originated 
solely for the purposes of distributing the loans to these securitization 
pools.  This shift created a potential conflict of interest between the 
originator and the end investor.  Bearing no credit risk in the original 
transactions themselves, originators were incentivized to create as many 
loans as possible so long as there remained a market for them through 
securitizations.2 
The securitization market for some of these loans remained robust 
even as the loans became riskier.  This was not so much because the risk 
appetite of end investors grew, but because the investors in some asset 
classes did not, and arguably could not, adequately assess the credit risk 
 
* Elliot Ganz and Phillip Black work for the Loan Syndications and Trading Association 
(“LSTA”).  Ganz is General Counsel and Chief of Staff, and Black is an Associate in the 
LSTA’s Research and Public Policy groups.  Ganz led the LSTA’s successful lawsuit against 
the Federal Reserve and the SEC asserting that Collateralized Loan Obligation (“CLO”) 
managers are not subject to the Dodd-Frank’s risk retention rule in Loan Syndications & 
Trading Ass’n v. Securities & Exchange Commission & Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System.  See Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n, 882 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  
The case was decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in February 2018, which ruled in 
favor of LSTA, thus removing CLOs from application of the risk retention rule. 
 1. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 83–101 (2011). 
 2. See id. 
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of the underlying loans.3  In many cases the loans were packaged into 
complex securitizations by the thousands; none of them could be assessed 
individually by the investors, partly because of sheer quantity, but also 
because investors were not in a position to acquire the knowledge about 
the borrowers that would allow for such an extensive analysis.4  Finally, 
investors were comforted by the fact that the credit ratings of the various 
securitization tranches remained robust despite the rising credit risk.5 
This build-up of risk in the residential mortgage market was 
considered by many to have been a precipitating cause of the financial 
crisis.6  This being the case, the OTD model that allowed for it became a 
target of Congress’s comprehensive legislative response, the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).7  
Congress sought to address OTD securitizations in drafting section 941 
of the Act, the “credit risk retention” provision, which required 
securitizers to retain a certain percentage of the credit risk of the assets 
they securitize.8  Doing so, they argued, would force the securitizer to 
align their interests more closely to those of their investors, and prevent 
the demand for the riskiest loans from arising in the first place.9 
Rather than drafting comprehensive rules implementing Dodd-
Frank, Congress, in accordance with common practice, delegated joint 
rulemaking authority under section 941 to a number of federal financial 
 
 3. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128 (2010). 
 4. For an interesting discussion on the unique advantages mortgage originators have in 
performing credit analyses, see Amiyatosh Purnananadam, Originate-to-Distribute Model 
and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 1–52 (FDIC Working Paper No. 2010-08, 2010), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982109 [https://perma.cc/5JLZ-
7NF6]. 
 5. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 1, at 118. 
 6. Id.  Almost any other reputable discussion on the financial crisis will cite the build-
up of risk in the residential mortgage crisis as the cause of the broader financial crisis.  See, 
e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128–32; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: CAPITAL MARKETS 95–96 (2017) [hereinafter 
TREASURY REPORT].  What remains disputed is what caused this build-up in risk.  The role of 
securitizations is only one among many possible factors.  See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128–32; 
TREASURY REPORT, at 91–105. 
 7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 941(b), 132 Stat. 1376, 1893 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
11(c)(2)(A) (2018)) (directing Federal banking agencies and SEC to “establish asset classes 
with separate rules for securitizers of different classes of assets, including residential 
mortgages, commercial mortgages, commercial loans, auto loans, and any other class of assets 
that the Federal banking agencies and the [SEC] deem appropriate” with respect to application 
of the risk-retention regulations). 
 8. Dodd-Frank § 941, 124 Stat. at 1890–96. 
 9. Id. 
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regulatory agencies.10 In doing so, Congress provided the agencies with 
basic guidelines: the risk retention provision would apply to 
securitizers;11 the baseline amount to be retained would be 5% of the 
credit risk of the underlying assets;12 and, since the OTD problems arose 
to various degrees across different types of securitizations, agencies 
could, using their own discretion, increase or decrease this baseline 
amount and even offer partial or full exemptions in some circumstances.13   
This delegation of authority created a situation, however, in 
which the agencies could deviate from both the letter and the spirit of the 
statute.14 And this the agencies did, especially in regards to their 
application of the rule to managers of open-market collateralized loan 
obligations (“CLO”).15  CLOs are often securitizations of large below 
investment grade corporate loans (often called “leveraged loans”).  In a 
typical CLO, a manager organizes and initiates a securitization by 
purchasing at its discretion corporate loan assets in the open market on 
behalf of the securitization.  Unlike the typical OTD securitization, 
managers do not originate any assets themselves and do not sell any assets 
to the securitization.  Accordingly, while CLOs are backed by relatively 
high-risk loans, CLO managers cannot be considered “securitizers” of 
 
 10. The federal regulatory agencies tasked with interpreting and implementing risk 
retention under section 941 were the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the 
“Fed”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) the Securities Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (“FHFA”).  The Fed, the OCC and the FDIC are collectively referred to as the 
“banking agencies”).  HUD and FHFA were charged with implementing section 941 only 
with respect to residential mortgage securitizations.  Thus, only the banking agencies and the 
SEC considered its application to CLOs. 
 11. Dodd-Frank § 941(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(77) (defining “asset-backed security” 
broadly to encompass all securitizations, making them subject to the risk retention provision).  
Under certain conditions, the regulators were allowed to split the risk retention requirements 
between securitizers and originators.  See id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(d).  Congress believed 
that in most instances, however, applying risk retention to securitizers only would achieve the 
statute’s objectives.  S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 129. 
 12. Dodd-Frank § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c) (establishing baseline requirement of 
5% credit risk retention). 
 13. Id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e) (exemptions, exceptions, and adjustments). 
 14. Jonathan H. Adler, What’s Wrong with Chevron Deference Is Congress, NAT’L REV. 
(June 6, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/06/24/whats-
wrong-with-chevron-deference-is-congress/ [https://perma.cc/HC62-P7WL]. 
 15. There are two types of CLOs: open market CLOs and balance sheet CLOs.  Open 
market CLOs are organized as vehicles for large, sophisticated investors to invest in leveraged 
loans and are actively managed.  Balance sheet CLOs are created by loan originators for the 
purpose of securitizing the loans and selling the securitizations to investors; they are not 
actively managed.  This Article is concerned only with open market CLOs. 
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CLOs according to the statutory definition.16  Thus, the agencies’ 
application of the rule to CLO managers violated the plain meaning of 
the statute’s language as well as the intent behind the rule.   
The final rules on risk retention were issued in October 2014, and 
became effective two years later.17  Shortly after the rule was issued, the 
LSTA initiated its lawsuit (the “LSTA Litigation”) against the SEC and 
the Fed by filing a Notice of Appeal with the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (“D.C. Circuit Court”), contending that the 
agencies exceeded their authority by imposing risk retention on CLO 
managers in the first place and then miscalculating the measure of risk 
retention by requiring 5% of the fair value of a CLO rather than 5% of its 
credit risk.18  The D.C. Circuit Court held that it lacked original 
jurisdiction and transferred the case to the D.C. district court.19 The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC and Fed, 
finding that they could reasonably read section 941 to treat CLO 
managers as “securitizers.”20  The district court also rejected the LSTA’s 
argument that the rule’s methods for determining risk retention were 
arbitrary and capricious.21  The LSTA appealed the district court’s 
decision and on February 9, 2018, a fter more than three years of 
litigation, the D.C. Circuit Court vacated the final rule’s application to 
managers of CLOs, agreeing that the agencies misconstrued the statutory 
language and that CLO managers were not securitizers.22 
This Article identifies and analyzes where specifically the 
agencies erred in applying risk retention to CLO managers.  Part II 
discusses the statutory provision, congressional intent behind it, and the 
agencies’ final rule as it applied to CLOs and CLO managers.23  Part III 
provides a discussion on how the agencies erred in their final rule, 
 
 16. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled definitively on this matter in the “LSTA 
Litigation.”  Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n & Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 882 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 17. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77601, 77602 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267). 
 18. Complaint, Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n & 
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 882 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-
00652-RBW). 
 19. Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 818 F.3d 716, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
 20. Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 223 F. Supp. 3d 37, 54-59 (D.D.C. 2016) 
 21. Id. at 59–66. 
 22. Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n, 882 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  Having ruled 
that CLO managers were not securitizers, the D.C. Circuit Court did not address whether the 
SEC and Fed miscalculated the measure of credit risk. 
 23. See infra Part II. 
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identifying three specific instances where the agencies violated 
congressional intent.24  Part IV provides an explanation as to why the 
agencies may have chosen to apply the rule to CLO managers even 
though the arguments against doing so seemed so clear, making the case 
that agencies could have known CLO risk retention was not supported by 
the statutory language and was contrary to congressional intent but 
proceeded anyway.25  Part V provides concluding remarks, finishing with 
a brief note on what should be considered going forward.26 
II. THE RISK RETENTION PROVISION, CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, AND THE 
FINAL RULE 
A. The Risk Retention Provision 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Congress identified two 
specific “abuses” in securitization markets.27  The first was the OTD 
securitization model, under which, as discussed, lenders would transfer 
all credit risk from underwritten loans to securitizers, who would then 
transfer this risk to end investors.28  The second was that end investors 
were not capable of assessing the true risk of the underlying assets 
because of the lack of clarity into the characteristics of the borrowers.29 
Congress created Section 941 of Dodd-Frank to address both of 
these problems.30  It sought to do so by requiring securitizers to retain a 
“material amount of risk”31 of the assets they securitize.32  By virtue of 
this requirement, securitizers would have sufficient “skin in the game”33 
by retaining this economic interest in their securitizations, aligning their 
interest with those of the investors.34  In such a situation, securitizers 
would have no incentive to purchase low-quality assets, and originators 
would have no incentive to create them since the demand for them would 
 
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. See infra Part V. 
 27. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128–29 (2010). 
 28. Id. at 128.  In many cases, the originator and the securitizer were the same party and 
the securitizer, in that role, would transfer loans directly to the securitization. 
 29. Id. at 128–29. 
 30. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 941, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890–96 (2010). 
 31. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 129. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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have dried up.  The first problem would be solved because loans would 
be originated in accordance with appropriate credit standards, and the 
second problem would be solved because securitizers would effectively 
perform the credit assessment function on behalf of investors.35 
There are three elements of risk retention worth noting for the 
purposes of this Article.  First, the “material amount of [credit] risk”36 
retained by the securitizers was determined in the statute to be “not less 
than [5%] of the credit risk for any asset [securitized].”37  Second, the 
authority for determining the specific amount of credit risk to be retained 
for each specific securitization was vested in the federal financial 
regulatory agencies.38  Third, “securitizer” is defined as either “an issuer 
of an asset-backed security,”39 or an entity that “organizes and initiates 
an asset-backed securities transaction by selling or transferring assets, 
either directly or indirectly, including through an affiliate, to the issuer.”40 
Congress understood that the two problems leading to the 
provision existed in varying degrees across securitizations, and instructed 
the agencies to tailor the rule to each securitization.41  The agencies were 
charged with adjusting the baseline 5% requirement up or down 
depending on the risk factors of each market,42 and were even permitted 
to issue partial or full exemptions when doing so would “help ensure high 
 
 35. Id.  The Senate Report states, “[o]riginators . . . will come under increasing market 
discipline because securitizers who retain risk will be unwilling to purchase poor-quality 
assets.”  Id.  This indicates both (a) how the credit assessment function in these contexts would 
improve, and (b) what such improvements to the credit assessment function would lead to. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)–(2) (2018); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 130. 
 38. Dodd-Frank § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(b)(1)–(2).  These agencies include the 
“Federal banking agencies”—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)—and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  
Id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(a)(1), (b)(1); see also Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 
77601, 77602 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 
246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267). 
 39. Dodd-Frank § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(a)(3)(A). 
 40. Id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(a)(3)(B). 
 41. See, e.g., id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(G) (allowing adjustments to the risk 
retention requirement); § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e) (permitting Federal banking agencies 
and SEC to issue exemptions, exceptions, and adjustments to the risk retention requirement 
for less risky classes of institutions or assets); cf. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 941(c)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. 
1376, 1896 (2010) (requiring study and subsequent report on any negative effect risk retention 
requirement has on securitization industry and market); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 130–31. 
 42. Dodd-Frank § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(2)(A)–(B); see also S. REP. NO. 111-
176, at 130–31. 
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quality underwriting standards”43 and “improve the access of consumers 
and businesses to credit on reasonable terms,”44 protect investors, or meet 
other objectives.45  In making this instruction, Congress warned against 
“a ‘one size fits all’ approach to risk retention,”46 stressing that the 
agencies should address asset classes individually and take into account 
“differences in the assets securitized, existing risk management practices, 
and in the structure of asset-back securities.”47 
B. Agency Proceedings 
The agencies jointly issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in 
2011, a re-proposal of the rulemaking in 2013, and their final Credit Risk 
Retention Rule in 2014.48  In the final rule, the agencies concluded that 
open market CLO managers are securitizers and must retain 5% of the 
fair value of the CLOs that they originate.49  The agencies reached this 
conclusion by determining that parties who facilitate the purchase of 
assets for securitizations act as securitizers, since their purchasing activity 
amounts to “transferring assets . . . indirectly to the issuer.”50  
Notably, in specifying the details of the risk retention standard for 
CLO managers, the agencies determined that the 5% threshold would be 
appropriate.51  However, rather than requiring CLO managers to hold 5% 
of the credit risk of the assets, the agencies required them to hold 5% of 
 
 43. Dodd-Frank § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(2)(A); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 
130–31. 
 44. Dodd-Frank § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(2)(B); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 
130–31. 
 45. Dodd-Frank § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(2)(B); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 
130–31. 
 46. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 130. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77601, 77602 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 
12 C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. § pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267).  The final rule 
was published on December 24, 2014, as a joint effort by (1) the OCC, (2) the Federal 
Reserve, (3) the FDIC, (4) the SEC, (5) the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), and 
(6) the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).  See id.  However, 
“[b]ecause only the [SEC] and the [Federal Reserve] codified the open-market CLO risk 
retention rules in their respective titles of the Code of Federal Regulations, they [were] the 
only defendant agencies” named in the LSTA Litigation.  Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n 
v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n & Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 882 F.3d 220, 
221 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted) (citing Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
77601–02, 77603 & n.10, 77604). 
 49. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77650–51, 77653, 77659. 
 50. Id. at 77650, 77653. 
 51. See id. at 7750–59. 
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the fair value.52  And they could do so in one of three ways: (1) in the 
form of a “vertical” interest, comprising 5% of each tranche;53 (2) in the 
form of a “horizontal” interest, comprising 5% of only the most 
subordinate tranche;54 or (3) in some combination of vertical and 
horizontal interests as long as it equaled 5% of the securitization’s 
economic value.55 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL RULE 
In the final rule, the agencies departed from congressional intent 
in three noteworthy instances.  First, they ignored the plain language of 
the statute when they defined CLO managers as securitizers.  Second, 
they ignored explicit statutory instruction when they required CLO 
managers to hold 5% of fair value rather than credit risk.  And third, they 
distorted Congress’s objective behind the statute when they applied risk 
retention to CLO managers even though the CLO market created neither 
of the two problems identified in congressional reports. 
A. The Agencies Ignored the Plain Language of the Statute 
As noted above, Dodd-Frank defines a securitizer as the issuer of 
an asset-backed security or the person who “organizes and initiates an 
asset-backed securities transaction by selling or transferring assets, 
either directly or indirectly, including through an affiliate, to the issuer.”56 
While a CLO manager clearly organizes and initiates an asset-backed 
securities transaction, they do so by purchasing assets in the open market 
on behalf of the issuer, not by selling or transferring assets to the issuer.57  
Nevertheless, the agencies ruled that CLO managers fit within the 
definition of securitizer, arguing that a CLO manager indirectly transfers 
the assets to the CLO issuing entity because the CLO manager has sole 
 
 52. See 12 C.F.R. 244.4(a)(2)–(3), (b), (c)(1)(i)–(iii) (2019) (Federal Reserve); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 246.4(a)(2)–(3), (b), (c)(1)(i)–(iii) (2019) (SEC). 
 53. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77613, 77651–52. 
 54. Id. at 77613–14, 77651–52. 
 55. Id. at 77613, 77616, 77651–52. 
 56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(a)(3) (2018) (emphasis added).  The statute also defines the 
securitizer as the issuer of the asset backed securities but the agencies did not contend that 
managers of CLOs were issuers. 
 57. Opening Brief of Appellant, at 22–23, Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. 
Securities & Exch. Comm’n & Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 882 F.3d 220 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018) (No. 17-5004). 
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authority to select the commercial loans to be purchased by the CLO 
issuing entity for inclusion in the CLO collateral pool, directs the issuing 
entity to purchase such assets in accordance with investment guidelines, 
and manages the securitized assets once deposited in the CLO structure.  
Most importantly, an asset is not transferred to the CLO issuing entity 
unless the CLO manager has selected the asset for inclusion in the CLO 
collateral pool and instructed the CLO issuing entity to acquire it.58 
The D.C. Circuit, in its decision in the LSTA Litigation, rejected 
this stretched argument, holding that CLO managers were not securitizers 
subject to risk retention.59  The court concluded that the agencies’ 
interpretation “seem[ed] to reverse the apparent flow of the ‘transfer’”60 
and disregarded the context, which led them to “embrace a reading of 
‘transfer’ that would include any third party who exerts some casual 
influence over a transaction,”61 including parties that “are clearly not the 
initiators of securitizations that Congress intended to regulate.”62  The 
court further concluded “[t]hat the agencies’ interpretation sweeps so far 
beyond any reasonable estimate of the congressional purpose confirms 
our view that the interpretation is beyond the statutory language.”63 
The D.C. Circuit was also bothered by the fact that the statutory 
language required securitizers to “retain”— not “obtain”—risk 
retention.64  Since CLO managers did not originate any assets, they never 
held the credit risk in the first place; consequently, it did not follow that 
they could retain that which they never owned.65  As the court put it, “the 
agencies conspicuously fail to offer a single real-world example of 
anyone ever using ‘retain’ to encompass a process like the activity that 
the rule would require of CLO managers: going out into the marketplace 
and buying an asset they never before held.”66 
 
 58. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77654. 
 59. Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n & Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 882 F.3d 220, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 60. Id. at 224. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 224–25. 
 64. Id. at 223–26. 
 65. See id. at 222–26. 
 66. Id. at 225. 
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B. Fair Value vs. Credit Risk 
As noted, Congress directed the agencies to regulate the level of 
“credit risk” to be retained by securitizers.  The agencies decided, 
however, that instead of requiring credit risk to be retained, they would 
require a certain amount of the fair value of the securitized assets to be 
retained—in the form, as noted, of a vertical interest, horizontal interest, 
or some combination of both.  In doing so, the agencies based the rule on 
a non-statutory factor and violated congressional intent.67 
Credit risk and fair value differ in significant ways.  Credit risk 
measures the likelihood that an owner of a debt instrument will not be 
repaid in full, and fair value measures the market value of the debt 
instrument at a given point in time.  Two assets can have the same fair 
values but differ significantly in credit risk.  For instance, one million 
dollars of AAA-rated U.S. Treasury bonds and $1million of BB-rated 
“junk” corporate bonds have the same fair value.  But the junk bonds 
come with a much greater probability of default. 
In the context of imposing risk retention on securitizers, the 
practical difference between credit risk and fair value is immense.  
Because credit risk is concentrated in the securitization’s most 
subordinated notes, a “horizontal” interest of 5% of the fair value of the 
securitization that is composed of the riskiest subordinated notes 
embodies vastly more (as much as ten times more) than 5% of the credit 
risk of the securitization.68  Yet, ignoring the statute, the agencies based 
 
 67. In the LSTA Litigation, the LSTA also asserted that the agencies acted “arbitrarily 
and capriciously” in relying on “fair value” rather than credit risk as the measure of risk 
retention.  Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 57, at 33–38.  Because the court ruled that 
risk retention did not apply to CLO managers at all, it did not consider this issue in its ruling. 
 68. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 57, at 35 (“Congress focused on credit risk 
for a simple reason: its goal was to ‘provide securitizers an incentive to monitor and ensure 
the quality of the securitized assets’ and to avoid losses, and asset quality and potential loss 
are measured through credit risk, not fair value.” (citation omitted)); see also S. REP. NO. 111-
176, at 37 (2010) (requiring retention of a percentage of credit risk was intended to have 
securitizers focus on the quality and potential losses of loans underlying the securitization).  
Notably, in an addendum to a comment letter submitted by the LSTA to the agencies on April 
1, 2013, Victoria Ivashina, Associate Professor of Finance at Harvard Business School, 
estimated that if a CLO manager were to hold merely 5% of the equity (rather than the fair 
value) of a CLO it would be exposed to 4.55% of the credit risk of the CLO over a six year 
horizon.  Victoria Ivashina, Associate Professor of Finance, Harvard Business School, 
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Credit Risk Retention (Apr. 1, 2013), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2013/April/20130415/R-1411/R-
1411_040113_111052_486187566706_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9F4-K5LV] (speaking on 
behalf of LSTA).  Interpolating from these findings, one can estimate that since CLO equity 
is typically about 10% of its capital structure, a horizontal slice of the equity equal to 
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the horizontal interest on fair value, departing entirely from a focus on 
potential losses or credit risk.69 
C. Distortion of Congress’s Objective 
Even had the agencies been correct in asserting that CLO 
managers were captured by the statutory definition of “securitizer,” they 
were still obligated to determine whether CLO managers should be, and, 
if so, at what level.70  And, despite the fact that CLOs are not OTD 
securitizations and do not present the types of concerns identified by 
Congress, the agencies did not see fit to exempt CLO managers from risk 
retention.  Moreover, the LSTA and several other commenters offered 
compromise proposals that would have been less disruptive for the 
market, while also aligning the level of risk retention more closely to both 
the 5% credit risk baseline required by the statute as well as the actual 
credit risk presented by CLOs.  Nevertheless, the agencies rejected all 
such proposals out of hand.71 
The agencies rejected the claim that risk retention was intended 
only to address OTD securitizations arguing that it was intended to apply 
to all securitizations.72  They also said that even if it were intended to 
apply only to OTD securitizations, risk retention should still apply to 
CLOs since CLOs share “some” characteristics of OTD.73  This, the 
agencies claimed, could most easily be seen in the fact that originators of 
leveraged loans retained little or no interest in the loans they originated 
and that they originated the loans as a “fee-generating, rather than a 
lending”74 business.75 
 
approximately 0.06% to 0.07% of the fair value of the CLO (rather than 5%) would be 
sufficient to meet the baseline requirement of 5% of credit risk retention. 
 69. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 57, at 35–36. 
 70. This is clear from the authority Congress granted them to tailor the rule to each 
securitization. 
 71. See Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77601, 77653–59 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified 
at 12 C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. § pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267). 
 72. One of the authors attended a meeting on July 25, 2011, with, among others, Paula 
Dubberly, Deputy Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance and the person at 
the SEC with primary responsibility for risk retention rulemaking.  Ms. Dubberly dismissed 
the LSTA’s arguments that the statutory language did not cover CLOs because, in her view, 
CLOs are structurally similar to CDOs and Congress could not have meant to exclude CDOs.  
This was the first time the SEC laid out its improbable theory that, to “indirectly transfer” 
assets was equivalent to purchasing assets. 
 73. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77654. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 77655. 
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This view is flawed for two main reasons.  First, it does not follow 
that while the leveraged loan and CLO markets may have shared some 
aspects of OTD, the real problems associated with OTD arose in those 
markets.  All securitizations (and, indeed, all securities issuances) share 
some characteristics of OTD, but the problems associated with OTD 
arose to varying degrees across the securitization spectrum; otherwise, 
Congress would not have felt the need to grant the regulators authority to 
tailor the rule from one securitization to another.  Second, the OTD 
dynamics in the leveraged loan and CLO markets are in fact very different 
from those of the OTD securitization market.  Unlike OTD 
securitizations, CLO managers do not originate any assets.  Instead they 
purchase loans at their discretion; loan originators, therefore, must 
necessarily originate loans that are credit-worthy and attractive enough to 
“clear the market.”76 
The agencies also failed to adequately address various proposals 
that would have more closely aligned the retention requirement with the 
5% credit risk retention baseline.  For example, one commenter proposed 
that the horizontal interest be limited to 1% of fair value, which amounted 
to approximately 10% credit risk retention.77  A number of commenters, 
including the LSTA, proposed that for CLOs that met various structural 
requirements designed to protect investors, managers be able to satisfy 
risk retention by holding a residual interest in subordinated, deferred 
compensation plus an additional interest of 5% of the equity notes (each 
component bearing approximately 5% credit risk).78  In support of these 
proposals, commenters pointed to features of CLOs that align investor 
and manager interests that led to the strong performance of CLOs during 
the financial crisis, the agencies’ own predictions of harms arising from 
excessive credit risk retention requirements, and the statutory directive to 
focus on credit risk.79  The agencies did not even respond to the 1% of 
fair value proposal and dismissed the LSTA’s proposal as inadequate 
because it would allow CLO managers to hold “under one percent of the 
fair value of the ABS interests issued to third parties (which is less than 
the [5%] required for an eligible horizontal residual interest).”80  This was 
 
 76. For an overview of the CLO asset acquisition process, see Opening Brief for 
Appellant, supra note 57, at 7–8. 
 77. Id. at 50. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 51. 
 80. Id. at 54. 
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particularly surprising since “the agencies acknowledged that CLOs 
contain ‘certain structural features’ that ‘contribute to aligning the 
interests of CLO managers with investors.’”81   
IV.  AGENCY MOTIVES 
The foregoing analysis raises two possibilities: either the 
agencies were ignorant of the shortcomings of their interpretation of the 
rule, or they harbored a bias against leveraged loans and saw risk 
retention as an opportunity to “rein them in.”  Since the arguments for 
excluding CLOs from risk retention are obvious, we think there is good 
reason to believe the latter.  Two arguments support this view. 
First, around the time they issued their proposed and final rules, 
the agencies demonstrated concern with the rapid growth in the leveraged 
loan and CLO markets and with a perceived deterioration in loan 
underwriting standards.  In March 2013, for instance, the banking 
agencies issued revised Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending,82 
which was meant to reflect the agencies’ belief that “increases in the 
origination and pooling of poorly underwritten leveraged loans could 
expose the financial system to risks.”83  In 2014, the banking agencies 
issued Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) for Implementing March 2013 
Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending84 and reportedly issued at 
least one letter critical of bank management known as “Matters Requiring 
Immediate Attention” after finding that the bank continued to originate 
loans that did not pass standards under the Shared National Credit 
 
 81. Id. at 55. 
 82. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & OFFICE OF 
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE ON LEVERAGED LENDING 
(Mar. 21, 2013) [hereinafter INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE ON LEVERAGED LENDING], 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1303a1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9LEJ-6DSP]. 
 83. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77601, 77651 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. § pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267).  The quote comes 
from the final risk retention rule but does a good job reflecting the motivations behind the 
issuance of the guidance.  See id. 
 84. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & OFFICE OF 
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ) FOR 
IMPLEMENTING MARCH 2013 INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE ON LEVERAGED LENDING (Nov. 7, 
2014), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/shared-national-
credit-report/files/pub-snc-faqs-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV2U-4A56]. 
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Program.85  Finally, in the final risk retention rule itself, the agencies 
pointed to a “rapid growth in the issuance of leveraged loans”86 and 
“widespread loosening of underwriting standards.”87  That the agencies 
failed to put the market’s growth in historical context or in the context of 
other markets without considering the benefits, in addition to the costs of 
the evolution of underwriting standards, demonstrates that the agencies 
viewed leveraged loans with tunnel vision in which the market’s 
evolutions by themselves indicated a potential bubble.88 
Second, the agencies could easily have reasoned (albeit 
incorrectly, as it turned out) that an inappropriate application of risk 
retention to CLOs would not have been successfully challenged in court.  
Two prominent roadblocks currently stand in the way of those who 
consider challenging federal agencies in court.  The first is that the 
method for bringing suit provided by the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”)89 is extremely expensive and time-consuming, and that the 
parties who might consider pursuing such a route are often intimidated 
by the prospects of suing those who supervise them and with whom they 
desire to have an ongoing relationship.  The LSTA’s case against the 
agencies on risk retention is a case in point.90  The suit was initially 
brought in 2014 but was not resolved until 2018 and cost more than $2.5 
million in outside counsel fees alone.91 The second roadblock is that the 
“Chevron Deference” doctrine provides agencies with a significant 
advantage in administrative actions.  Chevron Deference is the principle 
established by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
 
 85. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SHARED NATIONAL CREDIT REPORT, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/shared-national-credit-
report/index-shared-national-credit-report.html [https://perma.cc/4D9X-55LD]. 
 86. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 66750. 
 87. Id. 
 88. It is worth noting that negative sentiments towards leveraged loans and CLOs are 
held by some members of the press and Congress today.  See Elliot Ganz, Legislative and 
Regulatory Considerations in the Leveraged Loan and CLO Markets: Are They Still Safe?, 
25 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 3, Fall 2019, 59-66.  For example, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D. MA) 
recently introduced the “Stop Wall Street Looting Act”, Article VI of which contains 
provisions that would identify CLO managers as securitizers and impose risk retention on 
them at a level equal to 5% of the fair value of a CLO managed by such securitizer.  S. 2155, 
116th Cong. (2019).  A similar bill has been introduced in the House by Congresswoman 
Ayanna Pressley.  As of this writing no further action has been take on either bill. 
 89. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
 90. See Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n & Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 882 F.3d 220, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 91. Fearing possible repercussions to their individual institutions, a number of LSTA 
board members actually abstained from voting whether to sue the agencies even though the 
votes of the individual institutions were not recorded. 
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Council, Inc.,92 in which the Supreme Court found that (i) if Congress 
had not spoken directly to the precise issue in question, then (ii) judicial 
deference toward the agencies is appropriate as long as the agency’s 
answer is not unreasonable.93   
The advantage provided by this doctrine is significant.  From 
2003 to 2013, agencies prevailed under the Chevron framework 
approximately 77% of the time.94  Moreover, if the court found that 
Congress’s language had been ambiguous, the agency won 
approximately 94% of the time.95  Put another way, “only fifty-one of the 
1158 agency statutory interpretations [from that sample period] were 
invalidated by circuit courts”96 when the statutory language was 
unclear.97  It is no surprise, then, that in the LSTA Litigation, the U.S. 
District Court below ruled in favor of the Fed and SEC based strictly on 
a Chevron analysis, ruling that although the statutory language defining 
“securitizer” was vague, the agencies’ interpretation was nevertheless 
reasonable.98  Having this advantage, the agencies proceeded with the 
promulgation of risk retention regulations presumably without fear of 
losing in court.  Importantly, the D.C. Circuit Court, while ruling that the 
statutory language was not vague, nevertheless stated that had the 
statutory language been vague, Chevron Deference would have applied 
for the benefit of the Fed and the SEC and noted that the LSTA did not 
contest this point.99 
 
 92. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 93. Id. at 842–43; see also Jonathan Kim, Chevron Deference, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/chevron_deference [https://perma.cc/PP3P-ECQ7] (last 
updated Dec. 2017) (discussing Chevron deference). 
 94. Kent H. Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444 (2018). 
 95. Id. at 1444–45. 
 96. Id. at 1445. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n & Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 223 F. Supp. 3d 37, 49 (D.D.C. 2016) (“The Court 
concludes that (1) the two-step test under Chevron is appropriate to apply as a substantive 
standard for reviewing the agencies’ construction of the statute; (2) Congress did not 
unambiguously foreclose the agencies’ construction; and (3) the agencies’ construction is 
reasonable.”), rev’d, 882 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  The LSTA ultimately prevailed after 
another thirteen months when the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the 
statute was not ambiguous at all.  See Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n, 882 F.3d at 229. 
 99. Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n & Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 882 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2018), 4. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The agencies erred in applying Dodd-Frank’s credit risk retention 
provision to CLO managers.100  The agencies were wrong because CLO 
managers were clearly not included in the statutory definition of 
“securitizer” and because applying the provision to CLO managers would 
not help to achieve the provision’s stated objectives.101  The agencies 
were also wrong in the method by which they applied the rule by 
requiring CLO managers to hold fair value instead of credit risk and 
potentially increasing the amount of actual risk held far beyond the stated 
5% target.102  The authors believe that the arguments against the 
application of risk retention to CLO managers were obvious before the 
final rule was promulgated and that the agencies’ mistakes were easily 
avoidable.  The authors therefore argue that it was possible that the 
agencies knew the application of risk retention to CLO managers violated 
congressional intent but proceeded anyway, doubting that they would be 
successfully challenged.   
Two important factors worked in their favor.  First, the procedure 
for suing agencies under the APA is  very costly and time-consuming.103  
Congress could significantly mitigate the financial barrier by amending 
the APA to require that original jurisdiction for all APA challenges to 
financial services regulations lies with the D.C. Circuit Court rather than 
the current situation where jurisdiction, seemingly arbitrarily, sometimes 
lies with district courts and other times with the D.C. Circuit Court.104  
 
 100. See, e.g., Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n, 882 F.3d at 29, 226–29 (“[T]he 
ordinary meaning of [Section] 941 does not extend to CLO managers.  The agencies have 
gone beyond the statute to require managers to ‘retain’ the risk by acquiring it.” (citation 
omitted) (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988))). 
 101. Id. at 226–27. 
 102. Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 57, at 33–38; cf. Loan Syndications & 
Trading Ass’n, 882 F.3d at 225, 226–29 (discussing some of the “potentially serious 
consequences” of the risk retention rule under agencies’ interpretations); see also supra Part 
III.B (discussing concerns over agencies’ use of “fair value” rather than actual credit risk). 
 103. See supra Part IV.  As we also noted above, litigating against agencies that exercise 
ongoing regulatory supervision and control can be intimidating and fraught. 
 104. As noted above, because of the confusing jurisdictional rules the LSTA Litigation 
was initially filed with the D.C. Circuit Court which determined that it did not have original 
jurisdiction and transferred the case to the District Court.  The case ultimately ended up back 
with the D.C. Circuit Court on appeal.  See supra Part I. This confusion resulted in a delay of 
well over a year at an additional cost to the LSTA of over $1.5 million.  Although beyond the 
scope of this paper, the authors believe that litigation over complex financial services 
regulations is better heard at the D.C. Circuit Court which hears a much higher percentage of 
administrative law challenges than any other federal court.  See, e.g., The Jurisdiction of the 
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Second, Chevron Deference makes it more likely that regulatory 
agencies will prevail in any potential court case where the relevant 
statutory language can arguably be found to be ambiguous.105  This 
instance of regulatory indiscretion demonstrates how regulatory agencies 
can easily deviate from congressional intent, not only because of lack of 
statutory clarity, but also because of the probability of going 
unchallenged.  This scenario could theoretically be avoided in the future 
if Congress would be clearer and more explicit in describing its intent 
when drafting complex statutes, but the authors think that unlikely and, 
instead, join commentators and even Supreme Court Justices106 in 
questioning whether Chevron is an appropriate doctrine.  The authors are 
sympathetic to commentators who believe that Chevron raises significant 
constitutional and separation of powers issues, conflicts with the very 
purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act and is applied 
inconsistently.107  A deep examination of Chevron is beyond the scope of 
this article, but on a more fundamental and practical level, and as we’ve 
seen in the instant case, Chevron creates perverse incentives for 
regulatory agencies to take liberties with congressional intent.  We 
believe that the Chevron Doctrine should be abolished, either by the 
Supreme Court or by Congress. 
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